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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Markets arise in unexpected places. Take, for example, the case of kidney donation. 
Although the common conception of kidney donation is one of gift exchange, modern kidney 
donation is better characterized as a market. Kidney exchange is not, however, a commodity 
market, in which price determines who gets what. Rather, kidney exchange is a matching market 
in which money does not change hands and market participants care with whom they 
transact—in other words, they must be matched, through either individual search or intermediary 
involvement.  
Given that kidney exchange is a matching market, one might also expect to observe the 
widespread use of an instrument common to markets—formal contract. Although markets can 
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and do flourish under all conditions, including in the absence of third-party contract enforcement, 
markets in which exchange requires significant present investment in the expectation of future 
return are more likely to emerge and persist when institutions exist to protect property and 
contractual rights. Yet formal contract so far has played only a limited role in kidney exchange.  
This article discusses a new development in kidney exchange, the Advanced Donation 
Program (ADP), that permits a living kidney donor to donate a kidney in advance for the later 
benefit of a designated beneficiary who may or may not be in renal failure at the time of the 
donation. Referred to by some as a kidney “gift certificate,” “layaway plan,” or “voucher,”1 
ADP builds on the matching market principles that are fundamental to modern-day kidney 
exchange. But ADP, because of the advanced nature of the donations, pushes the market analogy 
even further, relying—for the first time—on a present investment (in the form of a healthy 
kidney) by donors who have an expectation of future return (in the form of a compatible kidney 
for a friend or loved one), leaving those donors potentially vulnerable to nonperformance. 
																																																													
1 Enrique Rivero, ‘Gift certificate’ enables kidney donation when convenient and transplant 
when needed, UCLA NEWSROOM, (July 11, 2016), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ 
gift-certificate-enables-kidney-donation-when-convenient-and-transplant-when-needed. 
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ADP also incorporates—again, for the first time in the transplant setting—the use of 
formal contracts regarding those performances, by including a contractual agreement in the form 
of consents to donate and receive a transplant. In another setting, the use of formal contracts 
would hardly be notable, given the temporal separation of obligations. However, the transplant 
community has historically viewed formal contracts in the transplant setting with hostility, and 
that traditional hostility remains evident in current ADP practice.2 This article demonstrates that 
the use of formal ADP contracts is likely inadvertent, and that these contracts are inadequate to 
tackle the complex, nonsimultaneous exchange of kidneys in which patients donate a kidney 
before their intended recipients have been matched with a potential donor. As currently 
structured, therefore, ADP poses risks to both transplant centers and registries, as market makers, 
and to donors, as counterparties who have made an initial investment in anticipation of future 
performance.  
At the big picture level, then, ADP is a useful case study offering insights on both market 
and contract development. It provides an unusual window into the evolution of the exchange of a 
																																																													
2 See infra notes XX and accompanying text (discussing this traditional and ongoing hostility).	
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single good—a kidney for transplantation—from gift, to simple barter, to exchange with a 
temporal separation of obligations that relies solely on trust and reputational constraints for 
enforcement, to a complex matching market in which the parties rely, at least in part, on formal 
contract to define and clarify their obligations to each other.  
At the small picture level, this article argues that ADP is a positive development, 
providing greater flexibility and the possibility of better matches for individual patients. Further, 
ADP could, if it reaches the full potential envisioned by many transplant professionals, increase 
the number of living kidney donors at a time of great shortage.3 In order to achieve that, 
however, ADP, as a system built on a foundation of trust and selflessness, cannot sustain too 
many instances of miscommunication and false hope. This article therefore offers some 
preliminary suggestions to improve ADP so as to maximize its potential to increase transplants, 
while also protecting donors, recipients, registries, and kidney swaps and chains more generally.  
Part II analyzes kidney exchange as a matching market, tracing the development of 
kidney donation from a gift model, in the case of deceased kidney donation; to barter, in the case 																																																													
3 Rivero, supra note 1 (noting that the program could increase altruistic donations by removing 
the fear that someone who donates now will not have a spare kidney for a loved one who might 
need one down the road). 
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of simultaneous kidney exchange; to exchange characterized by the temporal separation of 
counterparty obligations, in the case of Non-simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) 
chains; culminating in ADP. Part III discusses the role of contracts in various types of markets, 
highlighting the notable absence of formal contract in kidney exchange, even as that exchange 
has matured from a relatively simple system of simultaneous barter to a more complex system of 
intertemporal exchange. It also discusses the traditional hostility of the transplant community to 
formal contracts, arguing that ADP presents a rare opportunity for contract expansion in the 
kidney exchange setting. Part IV details specific mechanisms for improving ADP. Part V 
concludes. 
II 
KIDNEY EXCHANGE AS A MATCHING MARKET 
A. Commodity Markets Versus Matching Markets 
A market is a mechanism by which goods or services are exchanged. Often, money is 
paid in exchange for such goods and services. Despite the important role money plays in markets, 
however, it is not the essence of a market. As stated by Nobel Laureate Alvin E. Roth: “[u]ntil 
recently, economists often passed quickly over matching and focused primarily on commodity 
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markets, in which price alone determines who gets what . . . The price does all the work, 
bringing the two of you together at the price at which supply equals demand.”4 
So what is a matching market, and how is it different from a commodity market? In some 
markets, the goods and services being exchanged are indivisible and heterogeneous, which often 
leads to thin markets, in that it is harder to find the right exchange counterparty.5 For example, 
in a stock exchange, the buyer of a stock does not necessarily care from whom she is buying the 
stock, but if she is looking for an apartment, not just any apartment will do. In the apartment 
case, market participants must be appropriately matched, either through a centralized matching 
mechanism or through individual search efforts, before trading can commence.6  
Some well-known matching markets, developed using the principles of game theory and 
market design, include school admission systems (such as the centralized matching systems in 
																																																													
4 ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT — AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MATCHMAKING AND 
MARKET DESIGN 5 (2015). 
5 ALVIN E. ROTH, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM MARKET DESIGN? Economic 
Journal, 118 (March), 2008, 285–310.  
6 ECONOMIC SCIENCES PRIZE COMMITTEE OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY 
OF ALFRED NOBEL 2012: STABLE ALLOCATIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN 8 (2012).  
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New York City and Boston)7 and the National Resident Matching Program, by which all 
medical students get their first jobs as residents.8 Although money is used in these markets (for 
example, the application fees for school admission and the salary and bonuses in job hunting), it 
does not by itself determine who gets what. This is in contrast to a commodity market, such as a 
stock exchange, in which price alone determines who gets what. 
B. The Human Organ Matching Market 
Because buying or selling a human organ for transplantation is illegal in the United 
States,9 price plays no role in kidney allocation even though a compatible donor kidney is a 
																																																													
7 Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency 
in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
1954, 1957–59 (2009). See also Peter Dizikes, Game theory, in the real world, (May 1, 2012) 
(explaining how economists have used algorithms to build matching systems to assign students 
to schools in cities around the country) http://news.mit.edu/2012/profile-pathak-0501; Susan 
Adams, Un-Freakonomics, (July 22, 2010, 10:20 A.M.) (discussing Alvin Roth’s 
accomplishments applying game theory to modern problems like matching students with schools 
in NYC and matching incompatible kidney donation pairs with lone donors). 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0809/opinions-harvard-alvin-roth-freakonomics-ideas-opini
ons.html. 
8 Alvin E. Roth, The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match, 289 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 909, 910–11 (2003). 
9 See National Organ Transplantation Act 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for 
any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”). 
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valuable resource. Thus, even though a market in which human organs are bought and sold might 
mitigate the mismatch between kidney demand and supply, human organ allocation is a matching 
market.10 As detailed in the remainder of this section, the market for matching donors and 
recipients works differently for the allocation of deceased donor kidneys than it does for living 
donor kidneys.  
1. Deceased Donor Kidneys 
In the case of deceased donor kidneys, a kidney failure patient registers with the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), which is responsible for maintaining the waiting list and 
matching registered deceased donor kidneys to patients on the waiting list.12 In doing so, UNOS 
serves as the market maker—deciding who gets what and when based on carefully defined 
criteria. 
																																																													
10 See Gary S. Becker and Julio J. Elias, Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs, 
(Jan. 18, 2014, 4:58 P.M.) (outlining the full scope of this mismatch and arguing for the 
commoditization of the organ market), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=
WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth. 
12 See generally UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, https://www.unos.org (A private 
non-profit organization that administers deceased donor kidney procurement and allocation 
under a contract with the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, a governmental 
organization).  
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Today, more than 120,000 patients await kidney transplants.13 The waiting time for a 
patient on the deceased donation list ranges from a few months to more than a decade.14 An 
individual’s priority for transplantation depends on a variety of criteria, as determined by policies 
of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).15 Those criteria include: the 
patient’s tissue and blood type, time spent on the waiting list, the difficulty of matching the 
patient, and Estimated Post Transplant Survival.16 To be matched, the patient requires an 
immunologically compatible donor, as determined by the blood types and recipient antibodies 
against the human leukocyte antigens (HLA) of the donor.17  
2. Living Donor Kidneys  
																																																													
13https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-Transplantation-Stats.  
14 According to data from OPTN, the median waiting time for patients with Panel Reactive 
Antibody (measuring compatibility with a randomly chosen donor, with zero indicating a 
patient’s immune system can accept any blood type compatible donor’s kidney) lower than ten is 
1,381 days, and that for the patients with Panel Reactive Antibody higher than eighty is 4,149 
days. http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/latestData/rptStrat.asp. 
15 See OPTN Policies, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, (Sept. 1, 
2016) https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1200/optn_policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_08. 
16 Id.  
17 
http://repository.ul.hirosaki-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10129/4865/1/HirosakiMedJ_64_S45.pdf  
ref 1 or ref 2. 
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An appealing alternative to waiting for a kidney donation from a deceased donor is to 
find a healthy living donor. Most commonly, patients receiving a living donor kidney do not go 
through UNOS.18 Instead, patients and their potential donors present themselves to transplant 
centers, which then serve as the market maker that facilitates the donation.19 Because living 
donor transplantation is also subject to immunological compatibility constraints, many willing 
donors are incompatible with their prospective recipient—typically a loved one.20  
As a response to this challenge, economists and medical professionals developed Kidney 
Paired Donation (KPD) as a way to facilitate swaps between incompatible donor−patient pairs so 
that they can still have access to living kidney donation.21 Incompatible living donor−patient 
pairs swap with other pairs so that the donors who cannot donate to their intended recipients can 
																																																													
18 UNOS, Living Donation: Information You Need to Know. 
https://www.unos.org/wp-content/uploads/unos/Living_Donation.pdf 
19 Id. 
20	  G. Opelz. Impact of HLA compatibility on survival of kidney transplants from unrelated live 
donors. Transplantation 64, 1473-1475, 1997. 
21 See Dorry L. Segev et al., Kidney Paired Donation and Optimizing the Use of Live Donor 
Organs, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1883, 1883–84 (2005) (evaluating the impact of an improved 
matching scheme on the quality and number of transplants); Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez & 
M. Utku Ünver, A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 376, 
376 (2005) (explaining the gains and constraints of implementing a kidney matching program 
with incompatible patient-donor pairs). 
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donate to a different recipient in the exchange pool.22 In turn, her original intended recipient will 
receive a kidney from another donor, whose intended recipient is also receiving a transplant.23 A 
simple exchange between two pairs is illustrated in Figure 1. To facilitate these exchanges, KPD 
registries manage pools of potential donors and their intended recipients and use matching 
algorithms to find immunologically compatible exchange opportunities.24  
The matching algorithms are typically designed to maximize the number of patients 
matched to compatible donors and to minimize differences in waiting times among patients.25 
To that end, the KPD registries assign greater priority to hard-to-match donor−patient pairs, 
whose waiting time can otherwise be dramatically longer. This might also increase the number of 
transplants facilitated by the matching system, if done right.26 These matching algorithms have 
been evolving, just as the matching policies adopted by the UNOS national program for 
																																																													
22 Roth, et. al. supra note 21.  
23 Id.; Segev, et. al. supra note 21. 
24 Id.	
25 Segev, et al. supra note 21. 	
	 12	
traditional deceased donation are evolving. For example, some registries have given increasing 
priority to patients that are immunologically difficult to match.27 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of an exchange between two incompatible donor-patient pairs (A−B, and 
C−D): A intended to donate to B, C intended to donate to D, but unfortunately neither of them 
are compatible (indicated by the red cross); noticing that A is compatible with D, and C is 
compatible with B, the transplant center arranges a two-way exchange between the two pairs, in 
which both B and D receive a kidney transplant. 
Algorithm matching is only part of the challenge of paired donation, however. Because 
prospective donors can back out of a planned transplant, KPD leads to a potential reneging 
problem in which a donor has already donated her kidney as part of a planned exchange, but the 																																																																																																																																																																																																				
26 Wenhao Liu, Matching Lives – Reducing the Waiting Time in Kidney Paired Donation (2016) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford University Libraries). 
https://purl.stanford.edu/qy259pp1617 
27 See, for example, the matching algorithm description of the Alliance for Paired Donation, 
(http://paireddonation.org/about-us/algorithm/), in which a higher priority score is assigned to 
patients with higher Panel Reactive Antibody (PRA) levels, a commonly used measure for the 
difficulty of finding an immunological match for a given patient – a higher PRA level indicates a 
harder to match patient. See also NKR Quarterly Reports (2nd Quarter 2016) Page 7 and 9 on 
pool composition and PRA 
(http://www.kidneyregistry.org/pages/p384/NKR_QuarterlyReport2ndQuarter16.php). 
A B
C D
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donor originally matched with her intended recipient backs out of the transplant. Such donor 
reneging is rare, but not unheard of.28 As a result, KPD practice initially favored simultaneous 
surgeries for all involved in the exchange, to avoid the possibility of donor reneging.29 
An important innovation in KPD was the development of NEAD chains. These chains are 
initiated by a non-directed donor, who donates a kidney to a patient with an incompatible 
potential donor without expectation that a loved one receive a kidney in return, as illustrated by 
Figure 2.30 The incompatible donor can then donate to another incompatible pair, continuing the 
chain. Most often, the final donor of a chain donates a kidney to a patient on the kidney waitlist. 
The structure of NEAD chains removes the need for simultaneity, enabling patients to receive a 
kidney transplant before their paired donor donates, adding flexibility to KPD practice and 
permitting more transplants. If there is a significant time gap between a recipient’s transplant and 
																																																													
28 Wenhao Liu, Eric Treat, Jeffrey L. Veale, John Milner, and Marc L. Melcher. Identifying 
Opportunities to Increase the Throughput of Kidney Paired Donation. Transplantation: July 
2015, Volume 99, Issue 7, 1410–1415 (reporting two cases of donor reneging (Figure 2) during 
NKR’s practice between March 1, 2011, and April 23, 2013, when a total of 3,180 match offers 
were generated).  
29 Roth et al., supra note 21 . 
30 See Michael A. Rees et al., A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1096, 1096 (2009) (exploring the success of a chain of 10 kidney transplantations 
initiated by a single altruistic donor).  
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her paired donor’s donation, the donor is referred to as a bridge donor.31 Theoretically, the 
longer the time between the recipient’s transplantation and the bridge donor’s donation, the 
greater the risk that the bridge donor will renege on her promise to donate a kidney to the next 
recipient in the chain. 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of a KPD chain. The non-directed donor donates to an Intended Donor 
(ID) within a donor-patient pair, and then her original ID donates to the ID of the second pair, so 
on and so forth. Hence the donation of a non-directed donor can trigger a chain of transplants.  
If one of the potential donors in the chain does not honor her promise to donate, no direct 
and specific harm is done to any specific individual participant, because no donor has donated 
																																																													
31 Rees et al., supra note 30.	
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without her intended recipient receiving a transplant.32 However, the NEAD chain will not reach 
its full length, and potential transplants will not be performed. Moreover, as with any 
bargained-for exchange, if reneging were to become too common, confidence in the NEAD 
system could become compromised.  
Although UNOS was initially reluctant to participate in these living donor kidney 
exchanges, several non-profit registries have developed to match donors and patients and to 
facilitate transplants. The National Kidney Registry (NKR), established in 2008, has been the 
most successful registry, having facilitated nearly 2000 living donor transplants as of April 14, 
2016.33 Part of NKR’s success can be attributed to its innovative approaches to overcoming 
logistical obstacles.34  
3. The Advanced Donation Program 
																																																													
32 Liu et al., supra note 28. 
33 NATIONAL KIDNEY REGISTRY, http://www.kidneyregistry.org/. 
34 See L.A. Baxter-Lowe, M. Cecka, M. Kamoun, J. Sinacore & M. L. Melcher, Center-defined 
Unacceptable HLA Antigens Facilitates Transplants for Sensitized Patients in a Multi-Center 
Kidney Exchange Program, 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1592, 1595–97 (2014) (investigating 
the potential of multi-center kidney paired donation to overcome problems with cross-match 
criteria); F.K. Butt et al., Asynchronous, Out-of-Sequence, Transcontinental Chain Kidney 
Transplantation: A Novel Concept, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2180, 2181–84 (2009) 
(describing the first asynchronous, out-of-sequence transplant chain, which enabled more people 
to benefit from a single altruistic donation).  
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As noted in the previous section, donor reneging in NEAD chains may impede their 
efficiency by preventing them from reaching their full potential, but it does not harm any 
particular participant directly. A new KPD arrangement, the Advanced Donation Program (ADP), 
however, does present a danger of harming specific individual participants. Although ADP is 
still in its infancy, it is already being offered by at least nine transplant centers throughout the 
United States under the umbrella of NKR.35 
Recall that the intended recipient in a NEAD chain is transplanted before or 
simultaneously with her paired donor’s donation, reducing the possibility that the pair gives a 
kidney without receiving one in return. In practice, however, donors often have their own time 
constraints that interfere with this ideal. For example, patients or donors may have rigid time 
constraints, due to employment or other commitments, such that enforcing the convention of 
each patient receiving a transplant no later than the donor’s donation prevents them from 
participating in KPD.36 In response, NKR implemented ADP. In ADP, when a donor has a 
																																																													
35 See Rivero, supra note 1. 
36 S. M. Flechner et al., The Incorporation of an Advanced Donation Program Into Kidney 
Paired Exchange: Initial Experience of the National Kidney Registry, 15 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 2712, 2173 (2015) (discussing factors requiring advanced donation including 
a donor having a specific window of availability to donate).  
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compatible recipient in the KPD database and her intended recipient cannot be presently matched, 
the donor can choose to donate in advance.37 This advanced donation entitles the intended 
recipient to a “prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap within the NKR,” but 
does not guarantee that her intended recipient will receive a transplant from the exchange 
anytime soon, if ever.38 In contrast to the scenario in which a bridge donor may renege in 
standard NEAD chains, the risk in ADP is that NKR is unable to provide a compatible kidney to 
the intended recipient. Both the donor and recipient participating in ADP explicitly acknowledge 
this possibility in separate consent forms, attached hereto as Appendix A & B.39 
A Canadian case very similar to ADP serves as evidence that the risk of a patient 
experiencing a long waiting time or not receiving a kidney transplant is not merely hypothetical. 
Estella Jamieson and her son-in-law, Jeff Pike, participated in the Living Kidney Donor Paired 
																																																													
37	 Id.	
38 Id. 
39 NATIONAL KIDNEY REGISTRY, https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_consent_form_ 
intended_donor.pdf; NATIONAL KIDNEY REGISTRY, https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_ 
consent_form_intended_recipient.pdf; see also Flechner, supra note 31, at 2715 (“The ADP 
informed consent documents highlight the particular considerations that each donor and recipient 
are required to understand and affirm. Perhaps the most important consideration is that a time 
frame for identification of a suitable donor for the paired recipient cannot be predicted, and that 
due to logistical and medical concerns a future transplant through the ADP may never occur.”). 
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Exchange Program in Canada after Jeff developed renal failure and needed a kidney transplant.40 
Before the day of the surgeries, Jeff developed shingles and became unfit for the transplant 
procedure, so his transplant surgery was cancelled.41 Based on the promise that Jeff would 
receive top priority if she went through with her donation as scheduled, Estella decided to 
proceed.42 Yet months later, and long after Jeff’s health allowed him to go through surgery, Jeff 
was still not transplanted and the pair, reportedly unable to get a satisfactory explanation from 
the exchange program, aired their complaints publicly.43 Part IV revisits this case and argues 
that the current structure of ADP does not adequately handle such contingencies and risks.  
III 
CONTRACTS AND MARKETS 
So far, parts I and II have described matching markets, as distinct from commodity 
markets, and have detailed the ways in which kidney donation constitutes a matching market. An 
important aspect of markets—whether commodity or matching—is the element of contract. 																																																													
40 See Rosa Marchitelli, Organ exchange program slow to deliver on promise to man in need of 
a kidney, family says, CBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015, last updated 6:07 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/kidney-exchange-chain-breakdown-1.3263749; see also LIVING 
DONOR PAIRED EXCHANGE REGISTRY, 
https://www.blood.ca/sites/default/files/english_ldpe_brochure_general.pdf (outlining the details 
of the Living Donor Exchange Registry). 
41 Marchitelli, supra note 40. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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Though markets can exist even in the absence of enforceable contract rights—indeed, black 
markets often persist even in the face of legal bans on the market—exchange that requires 
significant present investment in the expectation of future return is facilitated by a legal regime 
of contract and such markets are less common and less robust in regimes lacking institutions that 
protect property and contract rights.44 This part discusses the role of formal contract (or, more 
accurately, its notable absence) in kidney exchange arguing that, as kidney exchange has become 
more complex, with performances and obligations extending across time, the possibilities for 
contract have similarly grown and may be underutilized. 
At the same time, there are substantial barriers to the expansion of contract as a response 
to the risk of nonperformance in kidney exchange. As will be shown, contracts are currently 
employed only reluctantly—indeed, most likely, inadvertently—and contain few firm 
commitments or obligations. Moreover, transplant professionals have traditionally been 
																																																													
44 See, e.g., Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 97, 101 (1991) (explaining how 
institutions help structure of the economy and thus influence the direction of economic change); 
See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (explaining how 
third party enforcement of contracts facilitates the emergence of sophisticated capital markets). 
	 20	
suspicious of contracts in kidney exchange and are distrustful of inviting lawyers and the legal 
system into the doctor−patient relationship.46  
Despite this, ADP may present a rare opportunity for an expansion of the use of contract 
in the kidney exchange setting. Accordingly, part IV suggests a variety of contractual and 
noncontractual mechanisms to protect patients and the integrity of ADP. Those suggestions 
include a more careful and detailed disclosure of the risk that a kidney may not be found for the 
intended recipient or may be found only after great delay, as well as greater transparency 
regarding priorities and algorithms.  
A. Simultaneous Versus Intertemporal Exchange 
The recognition that kidney exchange is a matching market carries important implications 
for the instruments of market design. As previously noted, kidney exchange began as KPD, a 
relatively straightforward, simultaneous, barter-type exchange. As with all simultaneous 
exchange, formal contract plays only a limited role in traditional KPD. This is because contract 
law is primarily about enforcing promises. When exchange is simultaneous there is thus little 
																																																													
46	 See infra notes XX and accompanying text (discussing this in more detail).	
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need for contract law, and other legal mechanisms, such as tort and criminal law, are usually 
sufficient to address the parties’ needs.47 Perhaps not surprisingly then, formal contracts are not 
seen among traditional KPD donors, intended recipients, and market makers (the individual 
coordinating transplant centers).  
Rather, contract law is primarily concerned with an exchange of goods or services that 
extends through time.48 Such intertemporal exchange requires one or more parties to rely on and 
adhere to promises of future performance, and contract is the usual mechanism by which the law 
ensures that those promises are kept.49  
In contrast to traditional KPD, NEAD chains possess this element of intertemporal 
exchange and, as a result, donor reneging is a known risk in NEAD chains.50 One thus might 
expect contracts to play an important role in NEAD chain organization. However, significant 
enforcement hurdles inhibit the use of formal contracts to address the risk of donor reneging that 
																																																													
47 See ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 18–19 (2011) (explaining why parties 
enter into contracts).  
48 Id. 	
49 Id. 
50 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing NEAD chains and donor reneging 
risk). 
	 22	
arises from non-simultaneous performance in NEAD chains.51 Moreover, a contract purporting 
to require a reluctant donor to nonetheless part with her kidney is perceived as contrary to the 
ethical mandate that organ donation should be the purely voluntary act of a willing and informed 
donor.52 This would even be the case when a potential NEAD chain donor has procured a 
matching kidney for her paired recipient by promising to donate her kidney as part of the chain 
and then fails to do so.53  
As a result, the concept of contract lurks in the background of NEAD chain organization, 
without ever materializing. Patients inquire whether they will be required to sign a contract and 
are assured that they will not. Transplant professionals consider the possibility of formal contract, 
only to dismiss it as overly legalistic or detrimental to the doctor−patient relationship.54 Others 
simply assume that the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)55 renders NEAD chain contracts 
																																																													
51 Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L. 
J. 645, 663–67 (2012).  
52 Id. at 659 (noting that, though no court would literally force an unwilling NEAD chain 
participant to donate her kidney through specific performance, even monetary damages could be 
perceived as coercive of unwilling patients).  
53 Id. at 663. 
54 Id.	
55 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012).  
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illegal.56 In the end, therefore, it is moral commitment, social solidarity, and the screening 
practices of transplant professionals that control NEAD chain bridge-donor reneging—not the 
use of formal contracts.57  
B. ADP And Contract 
ADP participants sign separate consent forms in which the donor agrees to donate her 
kidney in exchange for her intended recipient’s (IR) “prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney 
as part of a swap.”58 This raises two preliminary questions: first, does this consent form a 
contract? And second, if so, what is it a contract for?  
The first question can be answered in the affirmative. The consent form is an example of 
the type of low-powered enforcement contract common in many relationships that rely primarily 
on trust and informal sanctions, rather than primarily on formal contract enforcement, to ensure 
performance. As for the second question, consistent with the case law and literature on 
																																																													
56 Healy & Krawiec, supra note 49 at 662. (suggesting that contract law does not necessarily 
conflict with NOTA’s prohibition of purchasing organs).  
57 Id. at 649. 
58 NATIONAL KIDNEY REGISTRY, 
https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_consent_form_intended_donor.pdf; NATIONAL KIDNEY 
REGISTRY, https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_consent_form_intended_recipient.pdf; See 
infra Appendices A and B. Although NKR drafted the ADP consents, they are administered by 
transplant professionals at individual transplant centers. 
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low-powered enforcement, the contract likely protects only against bad faith behavior on the part 
of NKR—for example, a complete failure to provide the IR with any priority. 
1. ADP And Low-Powered Enforcement 
Although the ADP consent forms promise the IR a “prioritized opportunity,” that phrase 
is not defined, and the forms explicitly provide that there is no guarantee that the IR will receive 
a kidney.59 At some level, this imprecision makes sense. The ease with which any IR can be 
matched may vary dramatically across patients and through time, depending on the IR blood type, 
degree of immunological compatibility with the general population, and age.60 Moreover, any 
number of unforeseen events could prevent a match to the IR or render matching more difficult 
than assumed at the time of contracting.61 Those unforeseen events could be recipient-dependent, 
that is, something could occur that makes it difficult to match the IR. For example, an IR might 
become too ill to receive a transplant or be too difficult to match because of immunologic 
																																																													
59 National Kidney Registry, Advanced Donation Program, Consent Form, Intended Donor and 
Intended Recipient, Appendix. See also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
60 Supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
61 Wenhao Liu, Eric Treat, Jeffrey L. Veale, John Milner & Marc L. Melcher, Identifying 
Opportunities to Increase the Throughput of Kidney Paired Donation, 99 TRANSPLANTATION 
1410, 1411–15 (2015) (discussing causes of stopped match offers that lead to delays in kidney 
exchange). 
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obstacles. These immunological obstacles can change over time, and by their nature, registries 
such as NKR have greater numbers of difficult-to-match patients.62 The unforeseen events that 
prevent matching could also be registry dependent, meaning that something could occur that 
renders NKR incapable of matching patients with donors. For example, NKR might dissolve, or 
a national program could take over the entire KPD process. 
There are generally three possible approaches a court might take when presented with the 
type of contractual imprecision posed by the promise of “a priorititzed opportunity” in ADP: (1) 
conclude that the promise is too indefinite to form a legally binding obligation, (2) conclude that 
a contract is formed, but that it is breached only through bad faith behavior, such as a complete 
failure to attempt to provide priority to the IR, or (3) conclude that a contract is formed and apply 
“high powered enforcement,” by attempting to divine the parties’ intent and gap filling the 
meaning of “prioritized opportunity.”63  
																																																													
62	 Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth, New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange. American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2012, 102(3): 354–359. (discussing how some 
transplant centers arrange exchanges internally, which tend to involve more easy-to-match pairs, 
and hence selectively register hard-to-match pairs to kidney registries.)	
63 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert F. Scott, Braiding: The Interactions of Formal 
And Informal Contracting In Theory, Practice, And Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1418 
(2010) (discussing the options available to the court in Eli Lilly v. Emisphere, 408 F. Supp. 2d 
668 (S.D. Ind. 2006)). 
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For both doctrinal and policy reasons, we believe that option two—finding a contract that 
can be breached only by bad faith—is both the proper and most likely outcome. The level of 
imprecision employed in ADP is not uncommon in instances where uncertainty about future 
outcomes makes specifying possible future states—and the obligations of the parties in each of 
those future states—impractical. Nonetheless, NKR has made a promise to the donor—one on 
which the donor has relied, to her detriment.  
In such cases, courts have sometimes applied what has been referred to as “low-powered 
enforcement.65” Low--powered enforcement imposes sanctions for “red-faced” violations of the 
agreement to provide a prioritized opportunity, but does not impose sanctions for a failure to 
reach particular outcomes.66 In other words, in the unlikely event that NKR were to make no 
attempt to match the IR with a compatible recipient on a prioritized basis then a court could 
conclude that NKR violated its promise to provide the IR with a prioritized opportunity. But a 
court would not, in a low-powered enforcement environment, attempt to direct any particular 
																																																													
65 Id. at 1427.  
66 Id. at 1417. 
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resolution—by, for example, concluding that the IR should have been transplanted with any 
particular kidney.  
For a number of reasons, it seems unlikely that a court would conclude that NKR has 
made no enforceable promise whatsoever to the donor (option one). The donor has relinquished 
an important and valuable item—a healthy kidney—and undertaken some health risk and 
physical discomfort. Further, she has suffered lost time and inconvenience, all in expectation of a 
future return—the possibility of a matching donor for her IR. In addition, NKR is the contract 
drafter, a repeat player, and the more experienced and informed party. As such, any ambiguity in 
the contract terms would traditionally be construed against NKR.67  
At the same time, any attempt by courts to gap fill the contract by finding a specific 
obligation on the part of NKR to deliver a transplantable kidney to the IR would be dangerous. 
As already noted, a number of contingencies outside of the control of NKR could prevent any 
specific match or transplant.68 Moreover, uncertainty regarding court interpretations of liability 
																																																													
67 Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law 382-83 
(7th Ed., 2012) (quoting Edwin W. Patterson, The Legal Interpretation and Construction of 
Contracts, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 853-55 (1964)). 
68 See supra notes 59-62and accompanying text.  
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could impede the development of ADP and similar advanced donation programs, and could chill 
future attempts at transplant innovation. Given the current kidney shortage, this is a substantial 
social cost. Though this approach is unwise, it cannot be ruled out entirely. Not all courts have 
exercised restraint when interpreting imprecise promises such as those contained in the ADP 
consent forms,69 and this possibility poses a legal risk to NKR and potential reputational risk to 
participating transplant centers and personnel, a concern to which we return in the following part 
II.B.2.  
2. Contract Resistance in Transplantation 
As should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the contractual protections currently 
contained in ADP consent forms impose few firm obligations and provide only limited 
protection to donors and intended recipients. Moreover, their incompleteness carries legal risk to 
NKR and potential reputational risk to ADP participating transplant centers and personnel. Given 
this risk, why do ADP participants not insist on more detailed contractual language? Why is 
NKR itself not incentivized to provide it?  
																																																													
69 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 63 at 1422–42 (criticizing cases in which courts have not 
followed the low-powered enforcement approach).  
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As already noted, formal contracts are largely absent from NEAD chains, despite the 
known risk of donor reneging. Of course, transplantation is not the only setting in which 
researchers have noted a reluctance to rely on formal contract. In his seminal study of Wisconsin 
businesses, Stewart Macaulay found that “businessmen often prefer to rely on “a man’s word” in 
a brief letter, a handshake, or “common honesty and decency”—even when the transaction 
involves exposure to serious risks.”71 One lawyer interviewed by Macaulay as part of the project 
complained that he was “sick of being told, ‘We can trust Old Max,’ when the problem is not one 
of honesty but of reaching an agreement that both sides understand.”72 
Many of Macaulay’s subjects viewed formal contract as a hurdle to closing a sale and 
detrimental to customer relations.73 Suing a customer was, at best, a last resort and lawyers were 
thought to only get in the way:  
[I]f something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with 
the problem. You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to 
do business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because 
one must behave decently.74 																																																													
71 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 58 (1963). 
72 Id. at 58-59.  
73	 Id.	
74 Id. at 61. 
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 Although the settings in which transplant professionals and Wisconsin businessmen 
operate are very different, there are many similarities in their attitudes toward formal contracts 
(and lawyers). One group of transplant professionals explained the issue in language notably 
similar to that documented by Macaulay: 
We maintain that the basic principle of organ donation is based upon selfless 
generosity and faith in the human spirit, rather than contractual obligations. We would 
discourage future participants from becoming mired in legal arguments and lengthy 
debates that would only cause interminable delays.75 
This rejection of NEAD chain contracts arose in connection with concerns over donor 
reneging and, as already discussed, contracts in that setting face a variety of enforceability 
hurdles and ethical concerns.76 The conclusion that other mechanisms are more suitable than 
contractual remedies for controlling NEAD chain donor reneging is thus an understandable 
(though not inevitable) conclusion.77  
In ADP, however, it is the donor who performs first and faces the risk of nonperformance 
by NKR. Many of the objections to NEAD chain contracts—which center around the possible 																																																													
75 F.K. Butt et al., supra note 34 at 2183.  
76 See Healy & Krawiec, supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing those hurdles); see 
also supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of donor reneging in NEAD 
chains).  
77 Id. 
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coercive and negative public policy effects of binding donors through contractual 
obligations—are not implicated by ADP, nor are the same enforceability barriers present.  
Yet resistance to formal contracting remains. In fact, our conversations and experiences 
with those involved with ADP suggests a resistance to even recognizing the current ADP consent 
forms as containing contractual obligations. A recent exchange in the American Journal of 
Transplantation introducing the concept of ADP provides just one example. The concept authors, 
in discussing ADP, never acknowledge the contractual nature of the ADP consent forms, despite 
our suggestion that the consents impose a contractual obligation.81 Once again, there are clear 
similarities with Macaulay’s interviews, notwithstanding the time gap (1963) and different 
setting (Wisconsin businesses): 
Often businessmen do not feel they have ‘a contract’—rather they have ‘an 
order.’ They speak of ‘cancelling the order’ rather than ‘breaching our contract.’ When I 
began practice I referred to the order cancellations as breaches of contract, but my 
clients objected since they do not think of cancellation as wrong . . . Lawyers are often 
surprised by this attitude.82  
																																																													
81 See Flechner et al., supra note 36 (introducing the concept of ADP); Liu, Krawiec & Melcher, 
supra note 28 (raising concerns with the current structure of ADP, including the vague 
contractual language); S.M. Flechner et al., “Do the Right Thing. It Will Gratify Some People 
and Astonish the Rest.”—M. Twain, 16 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1039 (2016) (responding to 
Liu et. al but not addressing the contractual point). 
82 Macaulay, supra note 71 at 61. 
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To reiterate, there are justifiable reasons for this cautious approach toward formal 
contracting in the transplant setting—a complex and malleable system with many competing 
interests. Allocation strategies and prioritizations for different patients frequently are modified as 
utility and fairness are balanced.83 Moreover, courts have little experience with or expertise in 
transplantation, which could prompt concern about their ability to understand and evaluate these 
factors when, ex post, a transplant (or, in this case, a planned transplant) has not gone as 
expected.  
At the same time, the traditional objections to the use of formal contracts are not present 
in ADP. First, in ADP it is the registry that poses a risk of reneging, not the patient. Second, 
impediments to enforcement (to the extent that they exist) appear no greater or different in kind 
in ADP than in other contexts in which unforeseen events may frustrate the parties’ original 
plans. Finally, there are no concerns about binding unwilling donors to commitments that they 
may later regret—instead, it is NKR who is being held to its promises to the patient.  
																																																													
83 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing these changing algorithms).	
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It seems likely that the transplant community, conditioned to traditional objections to the 
use of formal contractual obligations in kidney exchange, has failed to appreciate, at this early 
stage of ADP development, that those objections are simply inapplicable to ADP. Moreover, 
transplant professionals involved in ADP, as already noted, do not appear to recognize that the 
registry is already committed through contract, but in a manner sufficiently vague as to carry 
risks that a court will find obligations in the contractual language not intended by NKR.86  
This lack of precision, in turn, imposes a risk on transplant centers and professionals 
involved in ADP. Frustrated patients, who may not understand the risks inherent in ADP, 
may—if the recipient is unable to be matched within a certain timeframe—turn to the transplant 
center, surgeons, and other personnel with whom she has already communicated and who 
performed the IR’s transplant, rather than seeking out the transplant registry, with whom she has 
had no prior direct dealings. If so, then any misunderstandings among patients about the risk that 
an IR will not receive a transplant under ADP and the obligations owed to her by NKR carry the 
possibility of reputational damage to individual transplant centers and professionals. Accordingly, 
																																																													
86 See supra note XX and accompanying text.	
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it is in the interests of patients, NKR, and participating transplant centers to seek more clarity in 
the ADP contract and to develop more detailed, standardized disclosures apprising patients of the 
risks inherent in ADP.  
As Macaulay noted so many years ago, the law is not the only—or even, necessarily, the 
most important—mechanism constraining the behavior of parties to exchange.87 Among 
Wisconsin businessmen, other considerations, including the reputational constraints on repeat 
players and an overriding norm that “one does not welsh on a deal” helped to ensure that defaults 
remained relatively rare events.88 Despite the similarities already noted between that setting and 
the transplant setting, there are also differences that suggest a more careful consideration of the 
benefits of formal contract in ADP is warranted. Like the Wisconsin businessmen studied by 
Macaulay, NKR is a repeat player in transplantation and relies on its reputation for care and 
trustworthiness in order to ensure patients, transplant centers, and the transplant community at 
																																																													
87 See Macaulay, supra note 71 at 62–63 (explaining that in many situations, contracts are not 
needed because there are many effective non-legal sanctions that can effectively resolve a 
problem); see also Barak D. Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 383-420 (2006); Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 115 (1992). 
88 Macaulay, supra note 71 at 62-63. 
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large that it is a safe partner with which to transact. Thus, we do not expect NKR to undertake its 
obligations to ADP patients lightly. Aside from its commitment to help transplant patients, rather 
than harm them, its reputation is a valuable asset and one it seeks to protect.  
Unlike the Wisconsin businessmen studied by Macaulay, however, ADP patients are not 
repeat players with an understanding of industry customs and practices. They are not represented 
by counsel, are highly motivated to complete the transaction, and are likely to be unsophisticated, 
at least in the details of transplantation and kidney matching. In other words, unlike the 
environment documented by Macaulay, in which problems are avoided without resort to formal 
contractual language and legal sanctions because “usually there is little room for honest 
misunderstandings or good faith differences of opinion about the nature and quality of . . . 
performance,” there is quite a bit of room for ADP patients to misunderstand the risks of 
advanced donation and the various contingencies that may prevent matching the IR as planned.92 
In addition, Macaulay was careful to note that “when defaults occur they are not likely to be 
disastrous because of techniques of risk avoidance or risk spreading.”93 Such risk mitigation 
																																																													
92 See Macaulay, supra note 71 at 62, 65–66. 
93 Id. at 63.  
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techniques are not available to ADP patients: a failure to transplant the IR as intended could be 
disastrous. Thus, as part IV argues, consent forms should endeavor to clarify the priority due to 
the IR as concretely as possible, more appropriately warn donors of the potential risks of 
advanced donation, and provide greater transparency.  
 
IV 
MAKING ADP BETTER 
Part III noted that the ADP consent forms likely constitute a contract, though one subject 
to only low-powered enforcement. Moreover, as we discuss below, the priority process and other 
aspects of ADP lack transparency and are not clearly disclosed to patients in the current consent 
forms. Finally, the forms do not address a number of possible contingencies, leaving the door 
open to future misunderstandings.  
These are problems for reasons that go beyond the possible harm to a patient who has 
undertaken the irreversible act of kidney donation for the future benefit of a loved one. One of 
the main goals of introducing ADP was to increase participation in living kidney donation and 
	 37	
help patients in need.95 And kidney exchange, as a system built on a foundation of trust and 
selflessness, cannot sustain too many instances of miscommunication and false hope. It is 
therefore important that participants share a common understanding about the arrangements. This 
includes clarifying the variability of waiting times, the priority that the IR receives relative to 
other recipients, and the actions to be taken in contingency situations. This part provides 
suggestions for improvement and points out challenges and nuances involved in the practice. 
The likelihood that the IR is able to receive a kidney depends on the difficulty of finding 
a match within the KPD pool and the degree of prioritization that the matching algorithms give 
to the IR.96 As previously detailed, the odds of matching an IR can vary dramatically and 
depend primarily on her blood type and the number of antibodies she has against potential 
donors. The consent forms should acknowledge this variation and perhaps even broadly quantify 
it. For example, NKR could provide information on what percentage of donors currently 
available in the registry match the IR. This would provide a sense of how difficult it will be to 
																																																													
95 See Rivero, supra note 1. 
96 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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find a future match. In addition, NKR could summarize the amount of time IRs within ADP have 
historically waited for a kidney.  
This information snapshot is insufficient, however, because the probability of finding a 
match changes over time based on the composition of the pool and changes in the IR’s 
immunological status. Introducing certain intermediate assurances could address the changing 
nature of the donor pool, build trust, and improve communication between the registries and the 
participants. Therefore, data on match likelihood and waiting times should be updated 
periodically. Such updating should not be an onerous burden to NKR. Currently, UNOS imposes 
a similar reporting obligation on transplant centers, by requiring them to update everyone on 
their deceased donor waiting list (which is currently much larger than the ADP participant list) 
through a biannual letter reporting the latest patient and graft one-year survival outcomes.99   
Though the variability of ADP waiting time can be explained to a great extent by factors 
also commonly seen in KPD, the prioritization given to IRs is unique to ADP. Given that a 																																																													
99 See OPTN Policies, supra note 15. Technically, transplant centers are required to report when 
a patient dies and when a graft stops working. UNOS then determines the patient and graft 
survival outcomes. The SRTR publishes the letter summarizing center based outcomes. See the 
following for details: Lisa B. VanWagner and Anton I. Skaro, Program-specific Reports: 
Implications and Impact on Program Behavior. Curr Opin Organ Transplant. 2013 Apr; 18(2): 
10.1097/MOT.0b013e32835f07f8. 
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prioritized opportunity is promised to the ID in exchange for her advanced donation, the failure 
of the forms to define “prioritized opportunity” is a startling omission that presents two issues for 
the participants.  
First, the lack of clarity makes it difficult to verify and enforce the efforts on the part of the 
KPD registry—in this case, NKR. How will participants know whether, and what sort, of efforts 
NKR has made to facilitate the IR’s transplant? Second, it adds one more layer of uncertainty on 
top of an already complex process, making it more challenging for a patient to understand her 
waiting time and for the registries to manage the patients’ expectations. Misunderstandings of 
this sort can lead to negative consequences, such as those illustrated by the Pike incident in 
Canada, even when transplant centers have made every effort to procure a transplantable 
kidney.103 
Clarifying the phrase “prioritized opportunity” is not simple, however. Any promise of a 
definitive timeline is unrealistic, for reasons already discussed.104 The matching algorithms of 
any KPD program—ADP or other—typically assign some kind of priority weight to each 																																																													
103 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the Pike incident). 
104 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainties in the ADP 
timeline). 
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patient,105 and higher weights are usually assigned to harder-to-match patients to promote 
equality in the system.106 So a seemingly obvious clarification might be to assign some 
pre-specified priority weights to IRs participating in ADP in the matching algorithm.  
The challenge with this approach is that the KPD matching algorithms evolve over time 
based on the evolving characteristics of the KPD pool,107 an evolution which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict and which is outside of the control of any KPD registry or center. The 
weights in matching algorithms are often adjusted, and in many cases the weights are not well 
documented.108 Therefore, the specification of priorities for ADP participants is not 
straightforward. Perhaps, however, the consent process could inform the IR and ID of their 
																																																													
105 See ALLIANCE FOR PAIRED KIDNEY DONATION, http://paireddonation.org/about-us/algorithm/ 
(explaining how it, one of the major KPD registries in the United States, publishes its matching 
algorithm on its website which details the numerical weights assigned to the patients based 
various medical and economic criteria). 
106 Medical Board Policies, NAT’L KIDNEY REG., 
http://www.kidneyregistry.org/transplant_center.php#policies (“[M]atch offers shall be selected 
to facilitate the most possible transplants except when difficult to match pairs can be matched. 
Pair matching difficulty shall be measured by the pair match power (PMPc) score.”). 
  
107 Compare Susan L. Saidman et al., Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by 
Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges, 81 TRANSPLANTATION 773 (2006) (tracing the 
early years of KPD, when matching algorithms were designed based on the belief that there are 
not many highly sensitized patients (patients with sensitive immune system that are likely to 
reject organ graft), with Itai Ashlagi et al., NEAD Chains in Transplantation, 11 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 2780 (2011) (outlining how new algorithms are designed in response to new 
data indicating that KPD pools involve a large number of highly sensitive patients). 
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priority relative to other patients, such as previous donors requiring a transplant, highly 
sensitized patients109, and the patients whose scheduled transplants were cancelled due to a donor 
renege. 
This challenge is further amplified when there is greater temporal separation between the 
ID’s donation and the IR’s transplant. To illustrate, in one case, a son wanted to donate for his 
mother but was constrained by military leave.110 ADP allowed him to donate and recover prior 
to redeployment, and his mother was successfully transplanted 5 months later.111 In cases such 
as this, where only a short delay is expected between the ID’s donation and the IR’s expected 
transplant date, there is less cause to worry about changing algorithms or deterioration of the 
recipient’s health.  
In contrast, some ADP IDs might participate in the program in order to gain future 
advantage for their IRs, who do not need an immediate transplant, but will likely need one later. 
Or, the program may eventually appeal to altruistic donors who want to donate their kidney to a 
																																																													
109 “Highly sensitized” patients are those with high PRA levels. See supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
110 Flechner et al., supra note 36. 	
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stranger, but only in exchange for the assurance that, should a loved one ever face renal failure, 
transplantation is not thwarted by this lost kidney because the registry has guaranteed priority to 
a designated beneficiary. Indeed, it is precisely this type of donor that provides the greatest hope 
of increasing the number of living donors and relieving the current organ shortage.113 But cases 
like these entail long anticipated waiting times. Managing expectations and clearly 
communicating risks to the patient are crucial because so many variables can change in the 
interim. 
At least two Advanced Donors already fall into this long wait category. Howard 
Boardman, a sixty-six year old retired judge, wanted to help his grandson, Quinn, who was born 
with a single defective kidney.114 Although Quinn would need a kidney transplant at some point, 
Mr. Boardman would be too old to donate when that day arrived. Boardman started a kidney 
chain by donating to a stranger in 2014, in exchange for a priority “voucher” that his grandson 
could use when he ultimately needed a transplant.115 That date could be years down the road, as 																																																													
113 See Rivero, supra note 1 (providing an example of an individual who donated a kidney to a 
stranger in exchange for assurance that his grandson would get a kidney in the future). 
114 Erika Edwards, Will “kidney coupons” revolutionize transplants?, WWLP.COM (July 11, 
2016, last updated 8:56 A.M.), 
http://wwlp.com/2016/07/11/will-kidney-coupons-revolutionize-transplants/.  
115 Id.  
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Boardman recognized: “I’ve left a legacy for my grandson,” he said, “I may not even be here 
when he realizes it . . . .”116 
In another case, a teenage girl had a functioning transplanted kidney.117 But transplanted 
kidneys from deceased donors last, on average, for only eight to twelve years, and transplanted 
kidneys from living donors last, on average, for only twelve to twenty years,118 meaning that she 
would eventually need another transplant. Moreover, because of the prior transplant, she would 
be sensitized and thus more difficult to match.119 Her father donated a kidney under ADP, in 
exchange for a “gift certificate” granting her priority should she need a second transplant.120 
The grandfather to grandson example could be even more complicated if multiple 
grandchildren were at risk of renal failure. NKR allows for up to five potential IR’s to be listed, 
																																																													
116 Rivero, supra note 1. 
117 Id. 
118 The Benefits of Transplant versus Dialysis, BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS MED. CTR., 
http://www.bidmc.org/Centers-and-Departments/Departments/Transplant-Institute/Kidney/The-
Benefits-of-Transplant-versus-Dialysis.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
119 See Highly Sensitized Transplants, CEDARS-SINAI, https://www.cedars-sinai.edu/Patients/ 
Programs-and-Services/Comprehensive-Transplant-Center/Kidney-and-Pancreas/Conditions-and
-Treatments/Highly-Sensitized-Transplants.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (explaining why some 
individuals with prior transplants are harder to match).	
120 Rivero, supra note 1. 
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stating that, “the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.”121 However, 
the “first appropriate candidate for transplant” will not always be clear and the factors that will 
be used in reaching a determination as to who is the first “appropriate candidate” are not defined. 
To illustrate, consider a situation in which multiple beneficiaries have chronic renal insufficiency 
(as could be the case if, for example, the kidney problem were genetic). Determining the most 
appropriate candidate may involve multiple considerations including the progression and severity 
of the disease and the age, diagnosis, and overall health condition of the candidates. For example, 
what if one beneficiary is more sick, and thus arguably the “most appropriate” candidate, but is 
middle aged? The other beneficiary may be able to last on dialysis longer, but is younger, thus 
giving the transplanted kidney a longer useful life. There is currently no indication in the ADP 
consent forms of how the “appropriate candidate” issue would be resolved or who has the 
authority to resolve it.  
Finally, whether the existence of formal contract is acknowledged officially or not, it is 
crucial to develop certain contingency plans for when circumstances prevent the participating 
																																																													
121 National Kidney Registry, Advanced Donation Program, Informed Consent, Intended Donor, 
Appendix. 
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parties from proceeding according to plan. In ADP, the IDs typically donate before the IRs are 
matched. Hence some IRs might find themselves no longer eligible for transplant surgery (this 
could happen if the health condition of the IR deteriorates), after their IDs have already 
undergone donation surgery. The IR consent form states: “I understand that this is 
non-transferable, and non-assignable.”122 The ID consent form does not contain such language. 
It can be argued that if the IR becomes ineligible for transplant surgery and her ID has donated, 
the priority should be transferrable, in which case someone should have the authority to 
designate another IR. In any event, the restriction should at least be explicitly included in the ID 
consent form, as the ID is the party to whom NKR is contractually obligated. Similar concerns 
have been raised,123 and NKR has adjusted its policy to allow an ADP donor to have up to five 
intended recipients, mediating this problem somewhat.124 But more clarity is still needed on the 
nature of the authority to re-assign priority and the ownership—to the extent it exists—of such 
authority, in the event that no named beneficiary is able to utilize the ADP priority. For ADP 																																																													
122 National Kidney Registry, Advanced Donation Program, Informed Consent, Intended 
Recipient, Appendix. 
123 Supra note 26. 
124 See Living Donors, NAT’L KIDNEY REG., 
http://www.kidneyregistry.org/living_donors.php?cookie=1. 
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practice to evolve and benefit more people, much effort is needed to prescribe reasonable courses 
of action in cases where it becomes challenging for the participants to perform as intended. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Organ donation has long been regarded as a noble and selfless act. Yet years of organ 
shortage suggest that altruistic donation has, so far, been insufficient to meet demand. This 
motivates transplant professionals to innovate, both in medical science and in the organization of 
transplantation. KPD and its variation, ADP, stand out among such innovations. By participating 
in these new systems, instead of passively waiting for a match to be identified by UNOS, renal 
failure patients can now influence their fates for the better. But, as a natural byproduct, more 
people are involved, and more complicated incentives and more unpredictable outcomes are 
introduced.  
Analyzing KPD and ADP systems as matching markets—as economists have done for 
many years in developing the matching algorithms—helps to highlight this inevitable complexity 
and uncertainty. ADP involves multiple parties whose promises of performance are often 
separated in time from actual performance. Yet medical professionals have resisted 
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(unsuccessfully, as we have detailed) the use of the most common market mechanism for 
aligning incentives under such conditions—a contract. Although a set of consent forms are used 
to communicate with the donors and recipients, those consent forms are vaguely worded, leaving 
much room for interpretation. Moreover, there is limited information in the consent forms 
covering contingency situations, making it challenging to manage participant expectation, and 
raising the question whether the consent forms are adequate in informing the parties involved. 
Transplant professionals—like many non-lawyers—are not fond of the idea of adding 
complex legal documents into the transplantation process, fearing it will undermine the 
foundation of trust and selflessness on which the transplantation system is built, and might 
impede their abilities to adapt to the fast-changing practice in the future. In the case of ADP, 
however, this resistance inadvertently created a vague yet binding contract, despite efforts to 
“leave the lawyer out of the room.” Although the most likely result of this contract is 
low-powered enforcement, there is always the possibility that a court will intervene more 
aggressively, interpreting vague terms in a manner that imposes specific obligations on the 
parties involved, including NKR.  
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As with many other innovations, kidney exchange has great potential in improving social 
welfare. At the same time, it is complex and vulnerable to miscommunication and mistrust. 
Therefore, clarity and appropriate prescriptive rules of behavior are needed. Though contract is 
only one mechanism for achieving that clarity, it is an important one under the circumstances. 
Moreover, it is a mechanism the transplant community has already inadvertently embraced. 
Having entered the realm of contract, a more careful drafting of that contract only makes sense.  
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National Kidney Registry
Intended Recipient Contact Information
Address:
Primary Phone Number: Email Address:
Secondary Phone Number:               Transplant Center:
Informed Consent Agreed to: Intended Recipient Identification Information
Name (Print): Blood Type: Gender:
Signature (Sign): Enter HLA Antigens Below:
Today's Date: A-1 B-1 B-2 DR-1 DR-2
SSN: DOB:
Witnessed by:
Signature (Sign):
Overnight original signed copy to: National Kidney Registry • 42 Fire Island Avenue • Babylon, NY 11702
Version 1.7
Intended Recipient's                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Government Issued                                                                                                
Photo Identification
Patients Risks: There is risk that I may not get transplanted through the ADP due to: 
     • A sensitization event (e.g. blood transfusion, pregnancy, etc.) 
     • A situation whereby I become medically unable to go to surgery
     • NKR’s inability to find an acceptable compatible donor
     • NKR unexpectedly shutting down operations
     • Having a blood type of “O” which can often delay a match offer for 1 - 2 years or more after activation
     • Being sensitized with a cPRA of 90% or greater which can often delay a match offer for 1 - 2 years or more after activation
     • Other unforeseen circumstances such as an act of nature
The Program: The Advanced Donation Program “ADP” allows a medically and psychosocially acceptable Intended Donor “ID” to 
donate their kidney via human organ paired donation (more commonly referred to as a swap) before their Intended Recipient “IR” is 
scheduled to receive a transplant via a swap. Once the ID donation has occurred, the IR may be activated by their transplant center 
for matching within the NKR. The ADP program is unrelated to the U.S. deceased donor system and participation in the ADP 
program does not confer any wait time points for the IR in the deceased donor system.  When an ADP Donor has multiple Intended 
Recipients, the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.
Your Situation: I understand that my ID would like to participate in the ADP and donate a kidney to another recipient through the 
NKR. This donation gives me a prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap, within the NKR. 
Information Release: I consent to the disclosure of all my health, medical, and personal information to the NKR for the purpose of 
participating in the ADP. I authorize the NKR to disclose, disseminate and utilize my health, medical and personal information in 
conducting the ADP, and I waive any and all privacy law claims that I may or may not have, in the use of this information as part of 
the ADP.
My Obligation: I understand that I must keep a copy of this form and present it to my transplant center when I return to receive my 
kidney. Additionally, I am willing to undergo the identity verification process when I return to receive my kidney. I understand that 
this is non-transferable, and non-assignable.
Advanced Donation Program
Informed Consent
Intended Recipient
Name (Print): Date:
A-2
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Intended Donor Contact Information
Address:
Primary Phone Number: Email Address:
Secondary Phone Number:               Donor Center:
Informed Consent Agreed to: Intended Recipient Identification Information
Name (Print):
Signature (Sign):
Today's Date:
SSN:
Donor Alias (Assigned by Center):
Witnessed by:
National Kidney Registry
Advanced Donation Program
Informed Consent
Relationship to IR:
The Program: The Advanced Donation Program “ADP” allows a medically and psychosocially acceptable Intended Donor 
“ID” to donate their kidney via human organ paired donation (more commonly referred to as a swap) before their Intended 
Recipient “IR” is scheduled to receive a transplant via a swap. Once the ID donation has occurred, the IR may be activated by 
their transplant center for matching within the NKR. The ADP program is unrelated to the U.S. deceased donor system and 
participation in the ADP program does not confer any wait time points for the IR in the deceased donor system.  When an ADP 
Donor has multiple Intended Recipients, the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.
Your Situation: I would like to participate in the ADP and I am willing to donate a kidney to an NKR patient and understand 
that my donation would give my IR a prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap within the NKR. 
Information Release: I consent to the disclosure of all my health, medical, and personal information to the NKR for the 
purpose of participating in the ADP. I authorize the NKR to disclose, disseminate and utilize my health, medical and personal 
information in conducting the ADP, and I waive any and all privacy law claims that I may or may not have, in the use of this 
information as part of the ADP.
Intended Donor
Version 1.7
Name:
DOB:
SSN:
Intended Donor's                                                           
Government Issued                                                          
Photo Identification
Risks: 
     • I may not be able to find a match and donate my kidney through the ADP 
     • I may become unsuitable for donation at any time in the process
     • My surgery may be delayed or cancelled at any time due to unforeseen events
     • NKR unexpectedly shutting down operations
     • There is no guarantee that my IR will be transplanted through the ADP
Name (Print): Date:Signature (Sign):
Intended Recipient Alias:
Overnight original signed copy to: National Kidney Registry • 42 Fire Island Avenue • Babylon, NY 11702
